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MANAGING A CORRECTIONAL MARKETPLACE:
PRISON PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM
David E. Pozen∗
I. INTRODUCTION
With two of the largest prison populations per capita in the
Western world, the United States and the United Kingdom1 are also
global leaders in the privatization of their prison systems. At yearend 2001, privately operated prisons held over 6.5 percent of
America’s state and federal adult correctional facility population,
representing more than 90,000 offenders.2 And in June 2001,
privately operated prisons held almost 9.4 percent of Britain’s total
adult correctional facility population, representing more than 6,000
offenders.3 Scotland, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
∗ M.Sc., Oxford University (Comparative Social Policy); B.A., Yale University (Economics).
The author currently teaches management at Payap University in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The
author thanks Louise Locock and George Smith from Oxford’s Department of Social Policy
and Social Work and Roger Hood from Oxford’s Centre for Criminological Research for their
helpful comments and suggestions. The author also wishes to acknowledge Patrick Bayer from
Yale University’s Department of Economics and John Simon from the Yale Law School for
many informative conversations concerning private prisons and prison regulation more
generally.
1 “United Kingdom” and “Britain” as used in this paper refer to England and Wales, which
maintain a common prison system. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate prison
systems, and are not considered here.
2 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice,
Prisoners in 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1, 8 (Table 9) (July 2002), available at
http://www.ojb.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
3 Calculated from HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, PRISON STATISTICS: ENGLAND
AND WALES 2001 35 (Table 1.18) (2003) and HM Prison Service, Privately Managed Prisons, at
http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/corporate/dynpage.asp?Page=123 (last visited Nov. 5,
2003). Note that Blakenhurst was still privately operated in June 2001. HM Prison Service,
Prison Service to Run Manchester and Blakenhurst Prisons, Jan. 12, 2001, at n.2, available at
http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?197 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
Australia has the greatest proportion of its prisoners in private prisons (about 20 percent), but
this represents fewer individuals in such prisons (about 4,000) than in the United States or the
United Kingdom. The bulk of the literature on correctional privatization has focused on the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the leading corporate operators of prisons have
generally come from these two countries, particularly from the United States. See COMPETITION
COMMISSION, GROUP 4 FALCK A/S AND THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION: A REPORT ON THE
MERGER
SITUATION
3.131-3.148
(2002),
available
at
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2002/471group4.htm#full (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).

253

254

Journal of Law & Politics

[Vol.XIX:253

and Canada have also recently witnessed the advent of private
prisons, while the Republic of Ireland, Latvia, Serbia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Tanzania, Costa Rica,
Jamaica, Panama, and several South American countries are all
purportedly giving active consideration to the idea.4 In less than two
decades, private prisons have become a significant component of
penal theory and administration around the world.
Privatization of prisons can take a variety of forms, spanning from
no facility ownership and partial operational administration to total
facility ownership and total operational administration by the private
contractor. In all existing privatization schemes, the state retains full
responsibility for allocating punishment in the sentencing phase, but
it delegates the responsibility for delivering imprisonment services to
a nongovernmental entity. In theory, “private prisons” could
encompass those run by private nonprofit organizations as well as
private for-profit ones, but in both the United States and the United
Kingdom there are at present no secure correctional facilities for
adults run by nonprofits.5 The debate over private prisons has
focused on cases in which for-profit corporations assume complete
managerial control over a prison.
It has been quite a debate: since their beginnings in the mid1980s and the early 1990s, respectively, the prison privatization
movements of the United States and the United Kingdom have
provoked several rounds of congressional and parliamentary
hearings and hundreds of articles discussing their philosophical,
organizational, economic, and legal implications.6 Yet while there
4 Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 265,
268-69 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 2001).
5 In the juvenile sector, by contrast, nonprofit organizations have “played a long and
distinguished role in operating [correctional] facilities” in the United States and, to a lesser
extent, in the United Kingdom. DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES INC., PRIVATE
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 5 (1998), available at
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/priv-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003) (describing
nonprofits’ role in American juvenile correctional administration); see also MICK RYAN & T ONY
WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN
BRITAIN 64-67 (1989) (describing nonprofits’ role in British juvenile correctional
administration). By 1990, almost 90 percent of U.S. states had at least one contract with a
private nonprofit corporation to operate a juvenile correctional facility. Robert B. Levinson &
William J. Taylor, ACA Studies Privatization in Juvenile Corrections, 53 CORRECTIONS TODAY 242,
248 (1991).
6 Notable scholarly contributions on prison privatization in the United States include:
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5;
IRA P. ROBBINS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE
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remains a contingent of vocal critics of private prisons in both
countries today, the debate over privatization has lost much of its
early ardor and prominence as the industry has reached a level of
maturity over the course of the past decade. After the initial flurry of
academic and popular commentary on American private prisons in
the 1980s, public discussion had largely died down by 1990.7 Pushed
back seven years or so, the literature in Britain experienced a similar
recession of interest in the topic. As the number and variety of
privately operated prisons have steadily increased, they have come to
be seen by many in the United States and the United Kingdom as a
natural part of the correctional system.
Inaugurated under
conservative administrations, private prisons were able to withstand
the election of the center-left governments of Bill Clinton and Tony
Blair, even though in the latter case the Labour Party had gone on
record in the mid-1990s promising that all private prisons would be
returned to the public sector once their present contracts expired.8
INCARCERATION (1988); MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1993); DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE
PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS (1995); Christine Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons:
Problems within the Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441 (1987); Samuel J. Brakel, “Privatization” in Corrections:
Radical Prison Chic or Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1
(1988); John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, 92 PUB. INT. 66 (1988); Brian E.
Evans, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J. 253 (1987); Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987); Connie Mayer, Legal
Issues Surrounding Private Operation of Prisons, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 309 (1986); Ira P. Robbins,
Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987); Emanuel S. Savas,
Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1987); Mary R. Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy
Considerations for Government Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307 (1985). Notable contributions on
privatization in the United Kingdom include: RYAN & WARD, supra note 5; Shaheen Borna, Free
Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321 (1986); J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, An
International Perspective on Privatisation of Corrections, 31 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 174 (1992); J.
Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 150
(1993); Paul Moyle, Separating the Allocation of Punishment from Its Administration: Theoretical and
Empirical Observations, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2001); Robert G. Porter, The Privatisation of
Prisons in the United States: A Policy That Britain Should Not Emulate, 29 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 65
(1990); Andrew Rutherford, British Penal Policy and the Idea of Prison Privatization, in PRIVATE
PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 42 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990); Mick Ryan, Evaluating
and Responding to Private Prisons in the United Kingdom, 21 INT. J. SOC. L. 319 (1993); Mick Ryan
& Tony Ward, Privatization and the Penal System: Britain Misinterprets the American Experience, 14
CRIM. JUST. REV. 1 (1989); Richard Sparks, Can Prisons Be Legitimate?: Penal Politics, Privatization,
and the Timeliness of an Old Idea, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14 (1994); Robert P. Weiss, Private
Prisons and the State, in PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989).
7 Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means: The Re-emergence of Private
Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
29, 31 (1994).
8 In a March 1995 speech to a prisoners’ aid society, Labour’s shadow Home Secretary Jack
Straw declared that he regarded “the privatisation of the prison service as morally repugnant”
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Labour’s ultimate acceptance of private prisons provides an
indication of how entrenched they have become; when Labour took
power in 1997, Richard Harding observed at the time, private prisons
were already “a proven option in the UK and . . . integral to the
overall system.”9
However, even as prison privatization has entered the
criminological mainstream and the controversy has largely faded
from the public eye, nothing resembling consensus has emerged
regarding the desirability or even the performance of private prisons.
Critics remain adamant that allowing people to profit from
punishment is unacceptable on moral or symbolic grounds; they fear
the practical consequences of privatization on the quality of prison
regimes; and they decry the formation of a “prison-industrial
complex” potentially undermining correctional administration and
corrupting correctional policy. At the same time, privatization
supporters are convinced of its fiscal benefits; they insist private
prisons are more accountable and better managed than public
prisons; and they think privatization brings much-needed innovation
and competitive pressure to a traditionally inefficient, union-heavy
industry.
At the cusp of this second phase of prison privatization—in which
the terms of the debate have shifted from whether we should allow
private prisons to how we can best manage them—it is important to
assess the efficacy and effects of the privatization schemes currently
in existence. After a decade of steady growth in the United States
and the United Kingdom, privately operated prisons can no longer
be seen as just an experiment. Policymakers in these countries (and
beyond) need to evaluate the successes and failures of their
approaches to privatization in light of the alternative administrative
models that have been utilized. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in
the vast literature on prison privatization there have been “few
explicitly comparative works”10 thus far.
A comparative
and that, “[a]t the expiration of their contracts, a Labour government will bring these [existing
private] prisons into proper public control and run them directly as public services.” Alan
Travis, Straw Vow to Nationalise ‘Repugnant’ Private Jails, THE GUARDIAN, (Manchester), Mar. 8,
1995, at 6.
9 RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 9 (1997).
10 Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 174. Lilly and Knepper
mention only RYAN & WARD, supra note 5; Roger Matthews, Privatization in Perspective, in
PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989); and Ryan & Ward, Privatization
and the Penal System, supra note 6. The comparative work of Matthews and Ryan and Ward was
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understanding of the history, evolution, and present status of private
prisons in the United States and the United Kingdom can help
reinvigorate the debate over their appropriate role in a correctional
system, and it can help facilitate more informed regulation of all
prisons, private and public.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH
CORRECTIONS, THEN AND NOW
Although privatization may appear to be a relatively modern trend
in the American and British penal systems, both countries have a
long history of private sector involvement in prison management.11
At various points throughout the nineteenth century, state
governments in the United States contracted out the operation of
their correctional facilities to private entrepreneurs, who would then
utilize convict labor for profit. In 1825, Kentucky became the first
state to employ a private contractor to manage its entire correctional
facility system, and by the end of the Civil War the majority of
southern states had followed suit. In the latter stages of the 1800s,
however, private prisons came under attack from a broad coalition of
workers who argued against convict labor as unfair competition and
from reformers who protested the poor conditions of confinement in
private facilities. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
government had assumed responsibility for imprisonment and most
other criminal justice functions, and private entrepreneurs no longer
managed any adult correctional facilities.
In the United Kingdom, there was a significant private sector role
in corrections in the eighteenth century, but the state took over the
management of all prisons in the early nineteenth century. Most
local authorities then owned and ran the prisons within their
jurisdictions until the 1877 Prisons Act centralized the administration
of English and Welsh prisons under the London-based Prison
Commission, which was absorbed in 1963 as part of the Home

later augmented by Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4 and McDonald, Public Imprisonment by
Private Means, supra note 7.
11 See generally BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS
(1977); Borna, supra note 6; John G. DiPiano, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the
Twenty-first Century, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171 (1995).
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Office.12 Despite Jeremy Bentham’s persistent advocacy from 1787 to
1811 for privately run prisons he called Panopticons, he was
ultimately unable to persuade the governments of Pitt and Younger
to implement his scheme. Since the decisive rejection of Bentham’s
plan by a parliamentary select committee in 1811, the United
Kingdom has, by and large, subscribed to a model of public
management “involving some unsalaried people of reputed probity
(e.g., visiting magistrates) and a large proportion of publicly salaried
staff. This came about because it was assumed that the state alone
was competent to prevent neglect and cruelty and to create and
maintain reformatory systems of prison discipline.”13
Privatization reemerged in prison management when American
municipal and state governments began to contract with private firms
to run county jails and state prisons in the mid-1980s. After the
demise of privately operated prisons at the end of the nineteenth
century, federal and state governments in the United States had
continued to employ private companies to provide a variety of
specific services to correctional facilities such as food production,
educational programs, vocational training, and counseling.14 Since
the 1960s, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had been contracting with
private firms to run community treatment centers and halfway houses
to which federal prisoners were transferred prior to parole, and since
1979 the Immigration and Naturalization Service had been
contracting with private firms to run detention centers for suspected
illegal immigrants.
These developments, in low-security
environments at the fringes of the U.S. penal system, “provoked little
controversy or even notice.”15 The return to the full-fledged
management of correctional facilities by private firms, however,
aroused an immediate reaction. Congress held hearings on prison
privatization in 1986, and almost every criminal justice professional
association took a stand on the issue. Despite the protests of many,
privatization in the United States has continued apace since then,
with the capacity of private secure adult correctional facilities
12 The Home Office managed British prisons directly from 1963 until 1993, when the
modern Prison Service was instituted.
13 Bill Forsythe, Privatization and British Prisons—Past and Future, 73 PRISON SERVICE J. 35, 36
(1989).
14 CAMILLE G. CAMP & GEORGE M. CAMP, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE SECTOR
INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON SERVICES AND OPERATIONS 6 (1984).
15 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 30.
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increasing 856 percent between 1991 and 1998.16 By the end of
1999, fourteen corporations were operating over 150 private
correctional facilities for adults in the United States,17 earning
combined annual revenues in excess of a billion dollars.
The (re-)privatization of prisons came slightly later to the United
Kingdom, officially beginning in 1991 when Group 4 Remand
Services Limited (now Group 4 Prison Services Limited) won the
contract to run the new Wolds remand prison, which opened in
1992. Proposals for private prisons had first surfaced in the United
Kingdom in 1984 and 1985,18 though like its American counterpart
the British government had been contracting with private firms for
the detention of suspected illegal immigrants since 1970. After a visit
to private prisons in the United States, the Home Affairs Committee
of the House of Commons recommended in March 1987 an
experiment with the private management and construction of
custodial institutions.19 This report was followed by a Home Office
Green Paper20 and a government-commissioned consulting study21
that both recommended contracting with private firms to design,
construct, and operate remand prisons, and another Green Paper22
in 1990 that adopted most of the consultants’ recommendations.
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 provided enabling legislation for
prison privatization, granting the Home Office the power to contract
out the management of new prisons for unsentenced (remand)
inmates. This act was extended in 1992 to encompass sentenced
prisoners as well,23 and again in 1993 to enable the contracting out of

16 GAYLENE STYVE ARMSTRONG, PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC OPERATION OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES 2 (2001).
17 Charles W. Thomas, Private Adult Correctional Facility Census: A “Real-Time” Statistical
Profile, December 31, 1999 (1999), at http://www.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/census/1999/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2003).
18 ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, THE OMEGA FILE: JUSTICE POLICY (1984); SEAN MCCONVILLE &
ERYL HALL-WILLIAMS, TAWNEY SOCIETY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A RADICAL RETHINK (1985).
19 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOURTH REPORT: CONTRACT
PROVISION OF PRISONS (1987).
20 HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND
SYSTEM (1988).
21 DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, A REPORT TO THE HOME OFFICE ON THE PRACTICALITY OF
PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND SYSTEM (1989).
22 HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CRIME, JUSTICE AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
(1990).
23 Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Contracted Out Prisons) Order 1992.
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existing prisons.24 By April 1994 there were three private prisons
holding inmates in the United Kingdom, at Wolds, Blakenhurst, and
Doncaster. Following these initial three “management only” private
prisons, the Prison Service moved to a so-called DCMF (Design,
Construct, Manage, and Finance) model of privatization, with all new
private prisons built and operated by contractors under the Private
Finance Initiative. Today there are nine private prisons out of 138
total25 in the United Kingdom, and the Prison Service is currently
receiving bids for two more.26
The British prison system, overseen by the Home Office and
carried out by the Prison Service, is run entirely by central
government and financed out of general taxation. The United
States, by contrast, has a three-tier system of prison administration:
the Federal Bureau of Prisons oversees federal prisons, each state
(and the District of Columbia) oversees its own prisons, and most of
the 3,000 or so counties and some cities run their own local jails.27
The American correctional system, in addition to being much larger
than the British system, thus features a much greater degree of
diversity and fragmentation.28 In the United States, 12.3 percent of
federal prisoners and 5.8 percent of state prisoners were being held
in privately operated facilities at the end of 2001.29 Private state
prisons are concentrated in the South and the West, where organized
labor is weak and fiscal conservatism strong, with Texas holding the
most inmates in such facilities by far (16,331 in 2001), followed by
Oklahoma (6,658), Georgia (4,561), California (4,452), and Florida
(3,995).30 At midyear 1999, 2.3 percent of jail inmates in the United

24 Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Contracted Out Prisons) Order 1993.
25 This figure does not include the Immigration Removal Centre Haslar.
26 HM Prison Service, Privately Managed Prisons, supra note 3.
27 Jails in the United States hold people awaiting trial or sentencing or serving a sentence

of typically less than one year. Most jails are under the control of independently elected
sheriffs. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF JAILS, 1999 5 (2001).
28 Beyond adult corrections, the American prison system also exhibits more diversity and
fragmentation—and more privatization—in its treatment of juvenile offenders. In October
1999, 1,794 of the 3,712 residential juvenile correctional facilities in the United States were
privately operated. Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile Offenders in Residential Placement: 1997-1999, 7 JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: NATIONAL REPORT SERIES 1, 1 (Mar. 2002).
29 Harrison & Beck, supra note 2, at 8 (Table 9).
30 Id. at 8 (Table 9).
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States, or 13,814 individuals, were also being held in privately
operated facilities.31
III. WHY PRIVATIZATION?
The prison privatization movements of the United States and the
United Kingdom were driven by a common set of factors—concerns
over rapidly rising incarcerated populations and their associated
costs, problems with prison overcrowding and perceptions of a crisis
in corrections, and the government’s ideological preference for
encouraging free enterprise and diminishing the role of unionized
labor—but the relative weight of these factors varied between the two
countries. In the United States, strains to the prison system created
by the growth of the inmate population were more severe, and the
desire of public officials to save money and expand capacity more
quickly through privatization was stronger. In the United Kingdom,
the New Right’s broad commitment to privatizing government
services and its desire to undermine the Prison Officers’ Association
were key additional factors in stimulating private prisons. Lobbying
by U.S.-based correctional corporations may have helped open up
the British market for private prisons to some extent, but there is no
evidence that these efforts shaped policymaking, as the Home Office
undertook prison privatization in a highly cautious, controlled
manner over many years.32
More broadly, although the United Kingdom’s privatization
movement paralleled and drew on the United States’ movement in a
number of significant ways, it remained a separate phenomenon.
When it became clear that the United Kingdom would begin to
experiment with private prisons, many commentators echoed Robert
Porter’s pronouncement that the “time-honoured cliché that what
happens in America today happens in Britain tomorrow would seem
to be ringing true once again.”33 Yet the amount of direct policy
transfer was small, and the traffic of ideas was always dialectic, a twoway flow. For example, the United Kingdom’s Adam Smith Institute,
31 STEPHAN, supra note 27, at 6 (Table 9).
32 See Jamie Bennett, Private Prisons and Public Benefit: The Impact and Future of Privately

Operated Prisons, 135 PRISON SERVICE J. 40, 40-43 (2001); McDonald, Public Imprisonment by
Private Means, supra note 7, at 32-35, 42.
33 Porter, supra note 6, at 65.
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though supported with American money from the Heritage
Foundation, also maintained a U.S. office that promoted British freemarket correctional initiatives to the American public.34 British
politicians did not simply transplace American ideas and policies into
the U.K. correctional system, nor could they have given its vastly
different structure from that of the United States.35 After the initial
presentation of the privatization option by the Home Affairs
Committee,36 the Home Office spent over four years before inviting
private firms to tender for the first management contract in 1991. In
that interim period, it sponsored a number of studies and hearings to
assess the possible costs and benefits of private prisons,37 and the
approach it ultimately took to privatization—with output-based
contracts, multiple levels of monitoring, and market testing for
existing Prison Service facilities—departed from the American model
in substantive ways. Thus, while the United States’ experience with
prison privatization in the 1980s set an important precedent and
helped launch the idea onto the British political agenda, it did not in
and of itself constitute a motivation or guideline for privatization in
the United Kingdom.
A. Pragmatic Considerations
As incarcerated populations in the United States and the United
Kingdom increased throughout the last three decades of the
twentieth century, public prisons found themselves increasingly
unable to cope. In the United States, rising crime rates, stricter
sentencing laws, the War on Drugs, and efforts to combat illegal
immigration all helped contribute to a massive increase in the
prisoner population. Between 1973 and 1990, the number of

34 See RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 45.
35 See discussion in Section II supra.
36 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 19. This report cites the committee members’
recent experience visiting private prisons in the United States as encouraging evidence of the
potential role for private contractors in the British prison system. The committee members’
reactions to what they saw on their visit reveal how the impact of America’s privatization
example was mediated in the United Kingdom by politicians’ party affiliations and beliefs: all
four Labour members of the committee voted against adopting the report, while all seven
Conservative members of the committee voted in favor of it. See Forsythe, supra note 13, at 35.
37 See, e.g., DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 21; HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM, PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND SYSTEM (1988); HOME OFFICE FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM, CRIME, JUSTICE AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC (1990); H OME OFFICE FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM, COURT ESCORTS, CUSTODY AND SECURITY: A DISCUSSION PAPER (1990).
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prisoners under custody at any one time in the United States grew
nearly fourfold.38 Many American prisons became overcrowded as a
result, which created “acute difficulties in maintaining tolerable
regimes or minimum standards.”39 In the 1980s, federal courts
found large numbers of correctional facilities, and even entire state
prison systems, to be in violation of the Constitution’s prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishment” because of overcrowding and
inadequate conditions of confinement, so that by mid-1991, 40 states
were operating prisons found by the courts to have unconstitutional
conditions.40
In the United Kingdom, increasing prisoner populations also led
to a severe overcrowding problem in the 1980s;41 in the early 1980s,
for example, a third of the offenders in custody were sharing with
one or two others cells designed for only one person,42 and in June
1989 Wadsworth prison in London had only eight cells with access to
sanitation at night versus 1,149 without access.43 The British remand
population nearly doubled between 1979 and 1988,44 and conditions
were particularly deplorable in the remand prisons.45 Often, they
were so overcrowded that prisoners had to be kept in police cells,
forcing police officers to do double duty as prison officers.46
In both countries, then, rising incarcerated populations helped
lead to overcrowding and deteriorating conditions of confinement,
which in turn led to demands for expanded prison capacity and
38 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 37. See also ROBYN L.
COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990
(1991). A brief write-up of Cohen’s study is available at
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/prsn90.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
39 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 269.
40 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 37.
41 By 1990, England alone was imprisoning more people than any other Western European
country. Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 180. The United
Kingdom’s prisoner population leveled off in the early 1990s, but strong growth resumed
thereafter. HOME OFFICE, supra note 3, at 4 (Figure 1.1), 6 (Figure 1.3), available at
www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm57/5743/5743.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
42 Id. at 180.
43 Id.
44 A. KEITH BOTTOMLEY ET AL., RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM, MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF WOLDS REMAND PRISON AND
COMPARISONS WITH PUBLIC-SECTOR PRISONS, IN PARTICULAR HMP WOODHILL 9 (1997).
45 Reportedly, a 1991 Council of Europe probe condemned the standards of many British
remand prisons as “inhuman.” Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 189
n.17.
46 Rutherford, supra note 6, at 44-46.
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regime improvement. Privatization emerged as a response to both of
these demands. As the United States and the United Kingdom each
undertook one of the biggest prison building programs in its history
during the 1980s, recruiting the private sector in the effort offered a
chance to expand capacity more quickly and possibly more cheaply.47
In the United Kingdom, the 1988 Green Paper on remand prisons,
for example, argued that private contractors could add “a new
dimension of urgency and flexibility to the prison building
programme.”48 Private contractors could add even more urgency
and flexibility in the United States because most U.S. state
governments finance prison construction through bond issues, which
are usually subject to voter approval by referendum. Throughout the
late 1970s and early 1980s, citizens often voted down prison bonding
proposals even as they were simultaneously demanding that more
criminals be imprisoned.49 State officials therefore began to bypass
voter referenda for bond issues, resorting instead to lease-buyback
arrangements with private firms for the design, construction,
management, and financing of prisons, which allowed rent payments
to be paid out of the operational state budget instead of capital
accounts.50 Because the United Kingdom’s centralized prison system
draws its financial resources from general taxation, there is no need
for express voter approval of prison-related expenditures and so this
ease-of-financing motivation for private prison construction was not
pertinent there. Yet by the mid-1990s the DCMF model had won out
in the United Kingdom too, as prison administrators on both sides of
the Atlantic sought to avoid up-front capital outlays, induce price
competition among bidding contractors, and shift design and
construction risks to the private sector.51
47 Expansion of prison capacity had come at a large financial cost in both countries. In the
United States, for instance, federal and state prison systems allocated 14.5 percent more money
for new facilities or additions in 1991-92 than they had in 1989-90, while in the United
Kingdom, Home Office spending on jails increased almost 55 percent from 1988-89 to 1989-90.
Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 180.
48 HOME OFFICE, supra note 20, at para. 9.
49 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 270; McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private
Means, supra note 7, at 32.
50 Although some of the earliest private prison arrangements in the United States involved
only the private sector management of prisons built and owned by the state, the DCMF contract
soon became the standard model. In McDonald et al.’s 1997 inventory of private prisons in the
U.S., 50 of the 84 facilities were privately owned and subject to DCMF contracts. MCDONALD ET
AL., supra note 5, at 20.
51 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 270-71.

2003]

Prison Privatization in U.S. and U.K.

265

In addition to easier (for U.S. states) and potentially cheaper
financing of new prison construction, many correctional officials in
both countries believed privatization would yield cost savings through
reduced operational expenditure. Early government-sponsored
reports on prison privatization in the United States52 and the United
Kingdom53 put forward the standard argument that private firms’
profit motives would allow them to carry out imprisonment tasks
more cost-efficiently. Correctional agencies expected these efficiency
gains from contracting to save them money every year. Some U.S.
states made this expectation explicit, as in Florida’s statutory
requirement that its Correctional Privatization Commission “may not
enter into a contract . . . unless [it] determines that the contract or
series of contracts in total for the facility will result in a cost savings to
the state of at least seven percent over the public provision of a
similar facility.”54
In light of the deteriorating conditions of confinement in the
public prisons, privatization also offered the possibility for prison
reform, though this argument featured much more prominently in
the British debate than in America’s.55 There were many variants of
this argument, but generally privatization advocates argued that the
management experience, results-driven culture, and enhanced
accountability mechanisms of private contractors would enable them
to deliver prison services of higher quality, as well as lower cost.
Although the Prison Service did not face court orders to improve
prison conditions as did many U.S. states, these arguments gained
traction in the United Kingdom after a number of disturbances
rocked its public prisons throughout the 1980s, culminating in the
nearly month-long riot in 1990 at Risley—the “notoriously squalid”56
remand prison near Manchester. The Risley riot cemented the sense
of a crisis in corrections and prompted one of the most thorough

52 JOAN MULLEN ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECTIONS (1985).
53 DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 21.
54 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 957.07 (West 1993).
55 That privatization will lead to positive changes in prisoner treatment and prison
conditions is, of course, not a foregone conclusion; many have argued it will do just the
opposite. For a good summary of the arguments on either side of this debate, see LOGAN, supra
note 6.
56 Tony Ward, Privatization in the British and American Penal Systems, 4 EUROCRIMINOLOGY 51,
55 (1992).
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reviews ever of the British prison system, conducted by Lord Woolf.57
It also served to bolster the government’s commitment to better care
for inmates, especially in remand prisons, through whatever means
possible. When invitations to tender for the running of The Wolds
remand prison were issued to private firms in 1991, the
accompanying Home Office document emphasized “the opportunity
this presented for providing a constructive regime and for
developing a fresh approach to the treatment of remand prisoners.”58
By equating privatization with better performance, privatization
advocates in the United Kingdom were able to assume the moral
high ground in the debate over prison reform by claiming that critics
who argued no one ought to profit from punishment were placing an
ideological preference for the public sector over the very real needs
of prisoners.59
In the United Kingdom, the idea of cross-fertilization—that
having a private sector role would force the public sector to improve
its performance—became institutionalized in the 1990s in the form
of “market testing.”60 After the first two private prison contracts were
awarded for The Wolds and Blakenhurst, the Home Office began to
allow, and sometimes force, the Prison Service to compete with
private firms for management contracts, thereby testing its market
viability as a prison owner/operator in a consistent, explicit way. As
Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke argued in a newspaper editorial at
the time, the Home Office believed that doing so would yield crossfertilization benefits: “[m]arket testing will . . . cause the prison
57 LORD JUSTICE WOOLF, PRISON DISTURBANCES, APRIL 1990: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE
RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE WOOLF AND HIS HON. JUDGE STEPHEN TUMIN (1991).
58 BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 10. This tender document thus evoked the Home
Affairs Committee’s argument in the United Kingdom’s first government report on prison
privatization that the “problems of out of date and overcrowded prisons” could not be
overcome by the present system and “given the squalor of the state provided system [of
remand] there is no reason to suppose that privately managed institutions could not improve
conditions to the benefit of inmate and public alike.” HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note
19, at vii.
59 See, e.g., PETER YOUNG, ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, THE PRISON CELL: THE START OF A
BETTER APPROACH TO PRISON MANAGEMENT (1987); Kenneth Clarke, Prisoners with Private
Means, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 22, 1992, at 17; Max Taylor & Ken Pease, Private Prisons and
Penal Purpose, in PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 178 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989).
60 McConville had been the first to discuss cross-fertilization as a potential benefit of
private prisons. Sean McConville, Aid from Industry? Private Corrections and Prison Overcrowding,
in AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS 221, 240 (Stephen D. Gottfredson & Sean McConville eds.,
1987). In the United States, request-for-proposal competition for prison management has
typically been limited to private firms.
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service to examine its own performance in the light of competitive
pressure and encourage the spread of those reforms across public
sector prisons much more quickly than would otherwise have been
the case.”61
In the United States, by contrast, the issue of improving prisons
and correctional regimes did not play a significant role in the
privatization debate.62 Following the “nothing works” doctrine made
famous by Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks,63 widespread
disillusionment over the potential for prisoner rehabilitation had
diminished the public’s interest in prison services and increased its
interest in deterrence and (especially) incapacitation.64 Accordingly,
the improvement of prisons “was seen as a possible and desirable, but
not essential, by-product of better and more cost-effective [private]
management.”65 In the American privatization discourse, private
prisons were conceived of as supplementary to the overstretched
existing facilities, not as partners in the system that could provoke
widespread reforms.66
B. Political and Ideological Considerations
The prison privatization movements of the United States and the
United Kingdom each reflected a combination of pragmatic and
political/ideological motivations, but in the United Kingdom
political/ideological motivations loomed larger than they did in the
United States. In the face of rising crime rates, both countries’
governments were concerned to look tough on crime in the 1980s
61 Clarke, supra note 59, at 17.
62 McDonald et al. administered a survey on the last day of 1997 in which they asked 28

directors of U.S. state correctional agencies that were contracting with private firms to rank
their objectives in doing so. Only one director ranked “[i]mproving caliber of services” as his
first objective, while fourteen directors and eight directors ranked “[r]educe overcrowding”
and “[o]perational cost savings,” respectively, as their first objective. MCDONALD ET AL., supra
note 5, at 15-17.
63 DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975).
64 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995); Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The
Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (2003);
Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON:
THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman
eds., 1995).
65 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 272.
66 See Sparks, supra note 6.
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and early 1990s, and they therefore supported stiffer sentences and
the building of more prisons.67 More generally, the Republican
platform under Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and the
Conservative (New Right) platform under Margaret Thatcher and
John Major stressed the virtues of competition, fiscal restraint, and
an ethic of “managerialism,” with a focus on efficiency and outputs,
rather than the old ethic of “bureau-professionalism.”68 These values
translated into an attachment to private sector involvement in service
provision; Thatcher’s government, in particular, had what one
commentator described as “a pathological . . . antipathy to the public
sector per se, accompanied by a largely untested belief that the quest
for profits automatically increased the economic efficiency of
virtually any enterprise.”69 The first wave of privatization under
Thatcher primarily took the form of denationalization, with the stateowned enterprises British Aerospace, British Airways, British Gas,
British National Oil, and British Telecom all sold to private buyers.
Prison privatization occurred in the second wave of British
privatization, in which the Thatcher administration challenged the
government’s monopoly over ostensibly core functions in fields like
education, health care, and corrections. Because the deprivation of a
citizen’s liberty constitutes such an awesome manifestation of the
state’s power and because the degree of control prisons exert over
their inmates is so great, many agreed with Charles Logan that
private prisons represented in the 1980s—and still represent today—
“an especially significant part of the broader privatization
movement.”70
They also represented an especially significant victory for the
Thatcher administration. With a smaller, more slowly growing
incarcerated population than the United States (by proportional as
well as absolute measures), with less prison overcrowding and less
legal pressure to reduce it, and with weaker fiscal incentives in favor
of private prison construction, the United Kingdom did not have as
strong pragmatic reasons for privatizing prisons as did the United
States. Instead, as Mick Ryan and Tony Ward assert, prison
67 See Ward, supra note 56, at 51-55.
68 See generally DESMOND S. KING, THE NEW RIGHT: POLITICS, MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP

(1987); Ruth Levitas, Competition and Compliance: The Utopias of the New Right, in THE IDEOLOGY
(Ruth Levitas ed., 1986).
69 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 19.
70 LOGAN, supra note 6, at 4.
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privatization came “on the agenda because the New Right want[ed]
the state to do less as a matter of principle.”71 Under Reagan and
Bush, the United States also experienced a marked trend towards
privatization in the 1980s and early 1990s, and this helped establish a
climate conducive to the introduction and expansion of private
prisons.72 However, with a federal government under divided
Republican and Democratic control and with responsibility for
prison management diffused over literally thousands of county, state,
and federal agencies, the administrations’ ideological attachment to
privatization could not transform the whole prison system in the way
that it could in the United Kingdom. Prison privatization came
about in the United States as the product of dozens of disparate costbenefit calculations by prison administrators, perhaps influenced but
certainly not led by a governing ideology. In the United Kingdom,
on the other hand, Conservative members of parliament had to press
the case for private prisons in a single, public forum in the face of
fierce opposition.73 As a result, the debate over prison privatization
in the United Kingdom was more transparent, more concentrated,
and more overtly political. It served as a sort of ideological
battleground on which the New Right challenged some of the most
fundamental assumptions about state provision while the Labour
Party and the penal lobby defended one of the few remaining purely
public services from private sector encroachment.
Further evidence for the ideological tenor of Britain’s prison
privatization movement can be found in the influence of the Adam
Smith Institute (ASI), a right-wing think tank that came to
prominence during Thatcher’s tenure. Whereas in the United States
71 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 2.
72 Most concretely, the President’s Commission on Privatization, convened by Reagan’s

executive order in 1987, argued that “contracting should be regarded as an effective and
appropriate form for the administration of prisons and jails at the federal, state, and local
levels” and recommended that “proposals to contract for the administration of entire facilities
at the federal, state, or local level ought to be seriously considered.” PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION 149-50 (1988).
73 Virtually the entire British penal lobby—from the Prison Service, to the Prison Officers’
Association, to the prisoners’ union PROP, to the Prison Reform Trust, to the Howard
League—opposed privatization. See RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at xii. There were many
opponents of prison privatization in the United States as well, such as the National Sheriffs’
Association, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the National
Prison Project of the ACLU, and the American Bar Association, but there were also many U.S.
correctional administrators who supported privatization. Id. at xii, 31-34.
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the initial stimulus for private prisons came mainly from
entrepreneurs who were promoting their own correctional-services
ventures, in the United Kingdom the earliest proposals for private
prisons came from pressure groups like the ASI and policy reformers
like Sean McConville and Eryl Hall-Williams.74 In its 1984 report, The
Omega File: Justice Policy,75 the ASI made a zealous case for prison
privatization and put the issue on Britain’s political agenda for the
first time. The organization continued to play a leading role in
promoting prison privatization throughout the 1980s.76 Its ideas
were picked up by the Conservative Study Group on Crime,77 and
they were aggressively championed within the Conservative Party by
MP Michael Forsyth.78 The ASI lent the notion of private prisons a
measure of intellectual legitimacy in the United Kingdom, and its
single-minded push for privatization created a sense of urgency and a
flow of policy proposals on which politicians could draw.
The British New Right’s interest in private prisons also had a more
concrete motivation: it saw them as a tool to help break the power of
the Prison Officers’ Association (POA), one of the few trade unions
that had not already been marginalized since Thatcher came to
power in 1979.79 Anne Owers, the current HM Chief Inspector of
Prisons, reflects that “twenty years ago, the POA ran prisons. . . .
Their staffing levels could sometimes be ridiculously high.”80
Richard Harding has documented the POA’s long-standing
obstructionism to meaningful prison reforms through artificial
enhancements of overtime payments and through resistance to the
introduction of rehabilitative and vocational programs.81 The New
74 See ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, supra note 18; MCCONVILLE & HALL-WILLIAMS, supra note 18.
75 ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, supra note 18.
76 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 44-47; Ward, supra note 56, at 51.
77 See CONSERVATIVE STUDY GROUP ON CRIME, PRISONS (1986).
78 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 47.
79 The POA, unsurprisingly, opposed privatization from the start. See id. at xii, 51; Porter,

supra note 6, at 74. After sending representatives to make a tour of private prisons in the
United States, the POA submitted a memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons in February 1987 that attacked the conditions of confinement in the
prisons it had visited and questioned their corporate operators’ long-term motivations. See
Porter, supra note 6, at 76.
80 Anne Owers, unpublished, personal communication following speaking event at Trinity
College, Oxford University (May 21, 2003) (on file with author).
81 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 20, 134-36.
Some have recently suggested that the POA may have tried to undermine the performance of
certain private prisons in the 1990s by creating bureaucratic obstacles and withholding
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Right’s general ideological aversion to unionized labor was thus
reinforced in the case of the POA by specific complaints about the
union’s historic behavior, and in its quest to break the POA’s
influence the government found support, at least in the beginning,
from prison reformers who saw the POA as an obstacle to progress.82
In the United States, the relative weakness of unions, even in public
sector employment, meant that this issue never became as important
as in the United Kingdom. American correctional officials were
interested in gaining more control over their labor force, but they
saw this as an ancillary benefit of privatization, not as a compelling
rationale in its own right.
IV. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE RESULTS
While researchers in the United States and the United Kingdom
have conducted numerous comparisons between public and private
prisons, they have focused almost exclusively on cost and quality-ofconfinement measures and their findings have tended to be
inconclusive.83 Recidivism outcomes and prisoners’ opinions have
resources. LORD LAMING, TARGETED PERFORMANCE INITIATIVE WORKING GROUP, MODERNISING
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PRISON SERVICE (2000); DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON BUCKLEY
HALL (Feb. 2000). If true, such behavior would constitute a serious and pernicious form of
obstructionism.
82 See HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 20.
83 Representative examples from the United States include: WILLIAM G. ARCHAMBEAULT &
DONALD R. DEIS, JR., COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PRISONS IN
LOUISIANA: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF ALLEN, AVOYELLES, AND WINN CORRECTIONAL
CENTERS (1996); HARRY HATRY ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF PRIVATELY AND
PUBLICLY OPERATED CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES IN KENTUCKY AND MASSACHUSETTS (1989);
CHARLES H. LOGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, WELL KEPT: COMPARING QUALITY OF
CONFINEMENT IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE PRISON (1991); CHARLES W. THOMAS, ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMPARING THE COST AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE
PRISONS
IN
ARIZONA
(1997)
available
at
http://web.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/research/Ariz.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); Samuel J. Brakel,
Prison Management, Private Enterprise Style: The Inmates’ Evaluation, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 175 (1988); Charles H. Logan & Bill W. McGriff, Comparing Costs of Public
and Private Prisons: A Case Study, 216 NIJ RESEARCH IN BRIEF REPORTS 2 (1989); Douglas C.
McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). Representative examples from the
United Kingdom include: BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44; ISABELLE PARK, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE
COSTS AND PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY OPERATED PRISONS 1998-99 (2000),
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hosb600.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); JO
WOODBRIDGE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM, REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE COSTS AND PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY

272

Journal of Law & Politics

[Vol.XIX:253

typically been ignored, and the empirical analysis has often been
subject to serious methodological concerns. In a representative
lament, one oft-cited survey of research on prison privatization in the
United States found most of the studies comparing public and
private facilities to be “fundamentally flawed,”84 and in a similar
survey Kenneth Avio noted, “[t]o date, the empirical evidence
comparing private and public management of [correctional]
facilities has been scant and somewhat unsatisfactory.”85 Given these
weaknesses in the comparative literature, it is difficult to reach any
definitive conclusions about how successful prison privatization has
been in the United States and the United Kingdom. What evidence
we have, however, suggests that private prisons have a decent if
patchy record in the United States, while in the United Kingdom
their performance has at least equalled and probably outpaced that
of the public sector.86
On one of the most conspicuous measures of prison
performance—rates of escapes—private prisons in both countries
seem to be doing at least as well as their public counterparts.87 In the
United Kingdom, private prisons have had similar rates of intraprison assaults to those in public prisons.88 There have, however,
been small-scale riots at Parc and Doncaster prisons in the U.K., and
several major riots in U.S. private prisons—the best-known one

OPERATED
PRISONS
1997-98
(1999),
available
at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hosb1399.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). There have
been many more comparative studies performed in the United States, reflecting the greater
size, diversity, and longevity of America’s private prison sector.
84 Gaes et al., The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A Review of Research, in PRIVATE
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE app. 2, at 31 (Douglas C.
McDonald et al. eds., 1998).
85 Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics of Prisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 151 (1998), available
at http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0929-1261 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
86 As a number of thorough meta-analyses of public/private studies already exist, I do not
attempt to summarize here all of the studies’ findings. SHICHOR, supra note 6; Gaes et al., supra
note 84; Charles W. Thomas and Charles H. Logan, The Development, Present Status, and Future
Potential of Correctional Privatization in America, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 213
(Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993). I focus instead on the broad pattern of the findings, with
particular concern for the most recent results.
87 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 287.
88 PARK, supra note 83, at 26; WOODBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 36. No reliable comparative
evidence exists in the United States or the United Kingdom about inmate suicides, but in
Australia suicide rates in private and public prisons have been similar. David Biles & Vicki
Dalton, Deaths in Private Prisons 1990-99: A Comparative Study, 120 TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND
CRIM. JUSTICE 1 (1999).
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occurring at a Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) managed
facility in Youngstown, Ohio in 1998. Yet because “only fragmentary
information is readily available about public sector prison troubles,”89
it is difficult to infer too much from these disturbances.
On cost and quality grounds, studies in the United States have
typically concluded that private prisons performed as well as or better
than the comparator public prisons.90 Looking at cost-efficiency
from a governmental perspective, studies in Arizona91 and Florida92
found no strong evidence of private prisons offering significant cost
savings, while studies in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas found that
contracting did reduce costs to the correctional agencies.93 The U.S.
General Accounting Office concluded that, nationwide, the existing
evidence on cost performance was inconclusive.94 Looking at
prisons’ performance through data on a variety of quality measures—
such as administrative compliance, escapes, suicides, assaults on staff
and inmates, educational and vocational programming, and health
services—studies in Louisiana and Tennessee found broad parity
between the public and private sectors,95 while studies in New Mexico
89 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 290.
90 Research comparing the recidivism rates of public and private facilities has been

negligible; only one such study, by Lanza-Kaduce and Parker, has garnered any critical
attention, and it has been roundly disparaged for its small sample size and erroneous matching
of public and private releasees. LONN LANZA-KADUCE & KAREN F. PARKER, A COMPARATIVE
RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS IN FLORIDA (1998). The
key criticisms are FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND DATA
ANALYSIS, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF A STUDY ENTITLED: ‘A COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM
ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES FROM PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA’ (1998); Gaes et al., supra
note 84. These criticisms remain salient for the subsequent, published version of the study.
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and Public
Prisons, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 28 (1999).
91 THOMAS, supra note 83.
92 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY, REVIEW OF BAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND MOORE HAVEN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY (1998).
93 ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 83 (studying Louisiana); TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE,
FISCAL REVIEW COMMITTEE, COST COMPARISON OF CORRECTIONAL CENTERS (1995) (studying
Tennessee); TEXAS LEGISLATURE, SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
GOVERNOR OF TEXAS AND MEMBERS OF THE 72ND LEGISLATURE: FINAL REPORT (1991) (studying
Texas).
94 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING
OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE (1996).
95 ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 83 (studying Louisiana); TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE,
SELECT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS, COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PRIVATELY
MANAGED CCA PRISON AND STATE-MANAGED PROTOTYPICAL PRISON (1995) (studying
Tennessee).
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and Florida found superior performance on average under private
management.96 Douglas McDonald et al. conducted a national
survey of private prison contract administrators, who were asked to
rate the quality of service of the private prisons they oversaw.97 Sixtyeight of 80 respondents reported that the contractors’ performance
met contractual requirements, and 58 respondents reported that the
private prisons had an equal quality of service to comparable facilities
operated by government correctional agencies.98 McDonald et al.’s
national findings corroborate the more localized findings of other
American studies: “[i]n general, it appears that state and federal
governments are getting what they ask for in privately operated
prisons, with some notable exceptions.”99
The United Kingdom has also had examples of good and bad
private prisons, but overall its experience with privatization seems
more positive than negative. In his recent report on improving
prison management in the United Kingdom, Lord Laming provoked
no controversy by stating, “[t]o date the performance of the private
sector has been encouraging.”100 Initially, private prisons in the
United Kingdom generated significant cost savings for the state both
per prisoner and per certified place, but since the mid-1990s there
has been a convergence between private and public sector costs.101
The most recent comparative study sponsored by the Home Office
found that privately operated prisons offered an average savings of 13
percent in cost per prisoner in 1998-99, but little or no savings after
accounting for their greater rates of overcrowding.102 Despite this
overcrowding, the study also found that private prisons’ regimes were
of similar quality to regimes in public prisons, except the “privately
operated facilities tended to provide more purposeful activity and

96 LOGAN, supra note 83 (studying New Mexico); THOMAS, supra note 83 (studying Florida).
97 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 47-56.
98 On the former survey question (about meeting contractual requirements), three private

prisons were rated as exceeding requirements, and ten were seen as failing to meet
requirements. On the latter question (about quality of service in private versus public prisons),
ten private prisons were thought to exceed the performance of the public prisons, and twelve
were deemed inferior. Id. at 53.
99 Id. at 56.
100 LAMING, supra note 81, at 19, para. 8.
101 PARK, supra note 83, at 1; WOODBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 1.
102 PARK, supra note 83, at 3-4.

2003]

Prison Privatization in U.S. and U.K.

275

out of cell hours than their comparators, and more flexible visiting
hours.”103
Chief Inspectors’ reports over the last decade have often praised
the performance of private prisons in the United Kingdom, with two
glaring exceptions: Blakenhurst and, more recently, the juvenile
prison Ashfield.104 Of the last five inspection reports on private
prisons published by the Chief Inspector, three gave the
management highly positive reviews—at Doncaster, The Wolds, and
Forest Bank—and one gave the management at Parc a fairly positive
review.105 When evaluating Ashfield, however, Owers remarked,
this report is probably the most depressing I have
issued during my time as Chief Inspector. It describes
an establishment that was failing, by some margin, to
provide a safe and decent environment for children, or
to equip the young people in it with the education,
training and resettlement opportunities that are
supposed to be at the core of their sentences.106
In a subsequent speech, Owers seemed to find Ashfield’s
performance disturbing, but not indicative of any broader failures in
the private sector: “[Ashfield] was the worst, but some of the best
prisons I’ve inspected have been private ones.”107
Owers’
103 Id. at 26.
104 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED

KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON BLAKENHURST (May 2001); ANNE OWERS, HM
INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM
PRISON AND YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION ASHFIELD (Oct. 2002). Along with Buckley Hall,
Blakenhurst is one of the two privately operated prisons in the United Kingdom to have had its
contract cancelled and its (direct) management turned over to the Prison Service. In the case
of Buckley Hall, however, this cancellation occurred in spite of the Chief Inspector calling its
corporate managers and staff “constructive and humane” and appraising it “a thoroughly good
prison.” RAMSBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 3.
105 ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON AND YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION DONCASTER (Sept. 2001);
ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON THE WOLDS (Oct. 2001); ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON AND
YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION FOREST BANK (Aug. 2002); ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON PARC (Nov.
2002).
106 OWERS, ASHFIELD, supra note 104, at 3.
107 Anne Owers, unpublished, speaking event at Trinity College, Oxford University (May
21, 2003) (on file with author).
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predecessor, moreover, considered the privately operated Altcourse
prison the best he had seen: “Altcourse is, by some way, the best
local prison that we have inspected during my time as HM Chief
Inspector.”108
Beyond private prisons’ own performance record, their
introduction in the United Kingdom also seems to have generated
considerable cross-fertilization benefits in the Prison Service’s public
prisons. In the same speech, Owers commented that “[p]rivate
sector prisons have been a way of changing practice . . . to be more
forward-looking and flexible, including in the public sector.”109
Similarly, a Prison Service governor, discussing improvements in the
efficiency and quality of public prisons over the past decade, recently
acknowledged that “[p]rivately operated prisons have played their
part in this culture change.”110 The Laming Report documents a
host of these improvements, using such indicators as escape rates,
drug-testing results, and the quality of rehabilitative programs.111
The Prison Service has also adopted a number of measures aimed at
increasing cost-efficiency,112 which may help explain the convergence
in private and public sector costs per prisoner that occurred over the
latter part of the 1990s.
V. REGULATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
There has been an extensive debate in the literature about
whether privately operated prisons will be more or less accountable
to the state than publicly operated ones and how this will translate
into cost and quality performance.113 Prison accountability can be
enforced by governments through the mechanisms of public and
private monitoring, litigation, accreditation, and contractual
stipulations such as mandatory disclosure requirements. Penal
108 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON ALTCOURSE 7 (Dec. 1999).
109 Owers, supra note 107.
110 Bennett, supra note 32, at 41.
111 LAMING, supra note 81.
112 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 40.
113 See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING
ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS (2001); HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9; LOGAN, supra note 6; YOUNG, supra note 59. For a succinct
summary of the arguments on either side of this debate, see LOGAN, supra note 6, at 41-48,
available at http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwsoci/proscons.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
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officials and reformers seek more accountability in the prison system
in order to improve the standard and efficiency of operations; to
minimize the potential for corruption, prisoner abuse, and other
illegal practices; to facilitate better comparisons between prisons; and
to help avoid the problem of “agency capture,” in which regulators
become more concerned to serve the interests of industry groups
than some vague notion of the public interest. On many levels, the
accountability debate underlines the broader debate over whether
private prisons can be more effective than public prisons and
whether they can possess the same legitimacy.
A. Regulatory Strengths and Weaknesses
Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom has
instituted stronger administrative mechanisms for ensuring the
accountability of its private prisons, although both countries’ systems
of accountability suffer from conspicuous weaknesses. In the United
States, not all states statutorily require that private prison contracts
provide for the appointment of a monitor, and many states that have
such a statutory requirement do not specify what duties the monitor
should have or grant the monitor autonomous status.114 Practices
vary widely across jurisdictions; some state correctional departments
maintain a full-time, on-site monitor at all private prisons, whereas
some states have no on-site monitoring presence and only rare
inspections by contract administrators.115 At the national level, there
is no contract oversight unit or comparable body within the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. The primary mechanism by which government
agencies in the United States monitor their private prison contracts is
through American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation: at
the end of 1997, 57 of the 91 private prison contracts in force in the
United States required ACA accreditation within a specified time
period, usually three years.116 Since then, the requirement of ACA
accreditation has become nearly universal for private prisons, even in
states where the public prisons are not required to be accredited.117

114 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 39.
115 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 50.
116 Id. at 49. Sixty-one of the contracts explicitly required compliance with conditions
established in consent decrees or other court-mandated standards. Id.
117 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 315. ACA accreditation requires twenty-one
types of correctional facilities, including adult prisons, to meet all mandatory standards during
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Although this does induce a measure of accountability in the private
sector, the ACA has been frequently criticized for possible bias
resulting from its dependence on fees from prison inspections, for
the limited nature of its standards and inspections, and for its focus
on policies and procedures rather than practices.118 Moreover, in
most American private prisons no independent ombudsman exists to
whom prisoners can complain about their treatment. To the
contrary, private prisons generally have wide discretion to discipline
prisoners for on-site infractions, and critics have warned that these
prisons may make deliberate attempts to maintain occupancy, and
therefore profits, by making it more difficult for inmates to
accumulate the “good behavior” points necessary for early release.119
On the other hand, several aspects of prison regulation in the
United States play a strong role in ensuring accountability. Most
notably, opportunities for litigation by both individual prisoners and
by class actions (often initiated by watchdog groups on behalf of
prisoners) create a safeguard against inmate abuses. The threat of
litigation may also help enforce contract compliance since prisoners
can sue private prison operators for breaches of contractual
standards.120 Unlike public employees, private employees in the
United States are shielded neither by qualified immunity nor by the
Eleventh Amendment, which prevents inmates from suing state
employees in their official capacities for monetary damages.121 In
April 1999, for example, CCA paid out 1.65 million dollars to
prisoners who were affected by the riot in its Youngstown prison.122
In addition, executives of private companies can be sued more easily
and are less likely to be indemnified than government officials, and

an inspection by an ACA audit team. To remain accredited, a facility must pass inspection
every three years. Id. at 315-16.
118 See, e.g., PAUL W. KEVE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MEASURING
EXCELLENCE: THE HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION 78-89 (1996);
Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in the United
States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177, 193 (1996) (claiming the ACA’s standards fall short of international
law’s human rights standards).
119 See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 40 (1988).
120 ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 648-55.
121 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978).
122 InterNet Bankruptcy Library, Inmates Litigation: D.C. Scatters Inmates from Troubled Ohio
Prison, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTER (2001), at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010514.mbx
(last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
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judges and juries tend to be less deferential to private companies.123
Beyond the possibilities for legal redress, the United States also
features relatively open access to private prison contracts, as state
procurement laws typically require their public availability and
publicly listed corporations must file annual reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, prison authorities in
the United States have proven more willing than their peers in other
countries to cancel contracts of under-performing operators.
McDonald et al. document the cancellation of five state contracts in
the early and mid-1990s,124 and Harding documents nine more
cancellations of private prison contracts from 1995 to 2000.125
Despite having more rigorous standards and processes of
accountability overall than the United States, the British system of
prison regulation also has several notable deficiencies. For starters,
British laws make it much more difficult for prisoners—in both
private and public prisons—to sue over contractual noncompliance
or mistreatment: “U.K. . . . jurisprudence relating to prisoner
litigation is, by comparison [to U.S. jurisprudence], stunted and
ineffectual. Class actions generally are doomed to fail.”126 Moreover,
the British government allows financial information on private prison
contractors to remain proprietary and confidential, which stifles
efforts to make independent assessments of the relative costs and
cost-effectiveness of their operations.127 And while the United
Kingdom’s Inspectorate of Prisons does an admirable job evaluating
prisons and publicizing its criticisms, it only has the power to make
recommendations, not to enforce them. The take-up rate of its
suggestions has been notoriously poor; as Chief Inspector Owers
recently remarked, “[m]ost of our recommendations do get
accepted, but of course whether or not they get implemented is a
different matter.”128 Finally, the U.K. Home Office has, to date, been
123 See Low, supra note 64, at 41-42.
124 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 53.
125 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 323.
126 Id. at 322.
127 See BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 57; McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private
Means, supra note 7, at 41. Harding recounts the outrageous case of the Contracts and
Competition Group in the United Kingdom commissioning research into the comparative
efficiency of the first private prison (The Wolds) and a comparator public prison, only to
withhold the relevant contract from the researchers whom it had commissioned to perform the
research. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 70.
128 Owers, supra note 107.
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more reluctant than U.S. governmental agencies to cancel private
prison contracts. It has made only two such cancellations in over a
decade, one of which was unrelated to the contractor’s
performance.129
However, the Home Office enforces accountability in other,
powerful ways. As provided for in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the
state has the power to veto any potential hire for any level of
employment at a private prison, and it must positively authorize all
private prison personnel before they can act in that capacity.130 In
the United States, by contrast, most contracts allow private firms to
make their own hires with little intrusion. The Criminal Justice Act
1991 also stipulates that every contracted prison in the United
Kingdom must have its own controller, an appointed Crown Servant
who investigates and reports on all allegations against correctional
officers. In practice, most private prisons have two controllers—
evidence of the resource-rich nature of monitoring in the United
Kingdom.131 Because all disciplinary complaints against inmates by
the prison staff must be made to the controller, the distinction
between the allocation and administration of punishment is kept
clearer within British private prisons, whose operators have no
authority to make intra-prison disciplinary decisions on their own.132
The United Kingdom also monitors its correctional facilities through
a Prisons and Probation Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over all
prisons and through independent monitoring boards, in addition to
the inspections and reports by the Inspectorate of Prisons. Taken
together, these “U.K. arrangements amount to the strongest statutebased accountability structure currently in existence.”133 Although
the Ombudsman and the Chief Inspector have only recommendatory
powers, their reports are followed closely by the media and play an
important role in publicizing contractual violations and other

129 See discussion in note 104 supra.
130 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 314.
131 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 46. Harding

contrasts this resource-rich monitoring situation to that of Florida in the United States.
Florida, though known for its careful, structured approach to privatization, had only one
monitor available for each contract site in the mid-1990s. Without any administrative or
secretarial assistance, the monitors were each responsible for almost 1,000 prisoners. Id. at 4344.
132 Moyle, supra note 6, at 87.
133 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 40.
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performance problems. Reports by the Chief Inspector aim to hold
prisons to an international human rights standard, they discuss
negative findings with candor, and in addition to reviewing
quantitative performance results they also feature a substantial
qualitative component, including prisoner interviews.
This impressive methodology for evaluating and monitoring
prisons is reinforced by the Home Office’s approach to writing and
enforcing contracts. Compared to most American correctional
agencies, the Home Office applies relatively prescriptive, outputbased contracts to its private prisons, demanding that they provide
more rehabilitative and vocational programming than public prisons
and setting measurable expectations for escape, suicide, and assault
rates as well as a variety of health and nutrition outcomes.134 When
private operators do not meet the terms of their contract, the Home
Office has shown its willingness to withhold performance-linked fees.
For instance, in the first six months of 1998 it withheld
approximately £800,000 from Securicor Limited, operator of Parc
prison, for failing to meet contractual requirements on numerous
health and safety measures. The amount of this fine would have
accounted for Securicor’s whole operating profit budgeted for that
period.135 As a result of such strict contract enforcement, by the end
of 1999 the Chief Inspector was able to report that “Parc has largely
overcome many of the problems with which it was beset.”136
VI. CONCLUSION: INCENTIVES AND REGULATORY REFORM
To the surprise of their critics and the satisfaction of their
supporters, private prisons have a reasonable track record in the
United States and the United Kingdom so far. In each country,
private prisons appear to have performed as well as or possibly better
than public prisons in terms of both cost-efficiency and quality of
service. Private prisons’ quality of service seems to have been
particularly high in the United Kingdom. In addition, there have not
134 See HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 139-41;
NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, THE OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF PFI PRISONS: REPORT BY THE
COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 1-2 (June 2003).
135 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 306.
136 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON PARC 1 (Oct. 1999). See also Harding, Private
Prisons, supra note 4, at 306.
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been any major corruption scandals involving corrections firms, and
there is no evidence that these firms have distorted or captured
policymaking.
Yet while private prisons have performed respectably in the
aggregate, their results have been highly inconsistent—including the
troubling examples of riots in several U.S. private prisons and abuses
at Blakenhurst and Ashfield in the United Kingdom. Rather than be
seen as outliers, these breakdowns in prison management should be
seen as indicative of the risks of contracting; with for-profit operators,
a prison can quickly degenerate when its management is determined
to save money by cutting corners and the government does not
intervene. Private prisons may have proven themselves more similar
than dissimilar to public prisons over the last decade, but their
greater risks place an added onus on regulators.
The regulatory weaknesses in the United States and the United
Kingdom, enumerated above, suggest areas where correctional
officials ought to focus their reform efforts. American officials
should establish new systems for monitoring and inspection in most
jurisdictions (or at least pressure the ACA to improve its
accreditation process), they should write contracts that specify
measurable outputs, and they should prohibit private prisons from
making their own quasi-judicial decisions concerning complaints by
and against prisoners. Meanwhile, the U.K. Home Office should
enhance public access to contractors’ financial information and
implement policies that link contract administration to evaluations
from the Chief Inspector. Given the paucity of credible comparative
evidence, regulators in both countries should also sponsor more data
collection and research into the performance of private versus public
prisons.
Perhaps the most powerful reform regulators in either country
could make, however, would be to create positive incentives for good
performance. Currently, the standard private prison contract in the
United States and the United Kingdom remunerates the corporate
operator based on the number of person-days of confinement
supplied, subject to some minimal level of amenities. The corporate
operator thus has almost no contractual incentive to provide
rehabilitation opportunities or educational/vocational training that
might benefit inmates, except insofar as these services act to decrease
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the current cost of confinement.137 Contracts in the United States
and the United Kingdom will fine or possibly even terminate
corporate operators for failures to meet certain requirements, but
they will not reward operators for achieving performance goals; these
contracts are all stick, no carrot. As a result, they fail to capitalize on
one of the potential advantages of the private sector—its willingness
and ability to innovate in pursuit of profits. If private prison
operators stood to make money from, say, improving literacy or
prisoner satisfaction rates, from reducing escapes or assaults, or from
preventing drug use or the spread of disease, then they would likely
find a way to achieve the necessary outcomes.
Creating such fiscal incentives would be especially welcome as a
tool to fight recidivism, perhaps the most destructive and intractable
problem plaguing both countries’ correctional systems.138 Designing
incentives to reduce recidivism would be difficult, but not impossible.
By controlling for inmates’ exogenous propensity to re-offend,
correctional agencies can model the proportion of a prison’s
recidivism rate attributable to the prison itself, and then make
compensation decisions accordingly.139 Short of fiscal incentives,
even simply publicizing league tables of recidivism performance
would create pressure for prisons to find recidivism-minimizing
solutions. In this way, not only would correctional agencies eliminate
any “perverse incentives” for-profit prisons might have to stimulate
137 See PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WITTE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE:
THEORY, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 345-46 (1984).
138 The largest study yet of recidivism in the United States found that of the inmates
released from state prisons, almost two-thirds were re-arrested for a felony or serious
misdemeanor within three years of release. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989). In the United
Kingdom, 59 percent of all prisoners discharged in 1998 were reconvicted—not simply rearrested—for a standard list offense within two years of their discharge. HOME OFFICE, supra
note 3, at 152 (Table 9.1). Considering that over 90 percent of all prisoners are eventually
released back into society, such high recidivism rates exact an enormous social cost. See
RUDOLPH J. GERBER, CRUEL AND USUAL: OUR CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).
139 For a discussion and examples of how to conduct such recidivism analysis, see Patrick J.
Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public versus Private
Management (July 2003), Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 863,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=441881 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). At present, the Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) appears to be the only correctional agency in either
country that evaluates its facilities based on their recidivism performance. See FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, BUREAU OF DATA AND RESEARCH, 2003 OUTCOME
EVALUATION REPORT (2003). The Florida DJJ does not link facilities’ revenues to their
recidivism performance, however, except through the possible elimination of particularly
poorly performing facilities.
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recidivism (in order to generate more future business),140 but they
would also enlist these prisons’ profit motive in the fight against
recidivism.
As the private prison industry becomes more transnational141 and
more consolidated and as overcrowding continues to increase the
strain on facilities, it will become all the more important in the
coming years for the United States and the United Kingdom to have
effective prison management systems in place. Correctional agencies
in both countries need to confront existing weaknesses in their
regulatory frameworks, they need to ensure the marketplace stays
competitive and diverse, and they need to create a new breed of
positive incentives for prisons to achieve performance targets. Doing
so would allow both countries to realize more of the potential
benefits of privatization while minimizing the possibilities for abuse.
With accountability better enforced, the public-versus-private debate
would become less significant and people could return their
attention to the broader questions of why we use incarceration and
why we have so many prisons in the first place.

140 See Avio, supra note 85, at 150 (discussing the economics of such “perverse incentives”).
141 The United Kingdom’s correctional marketplace reveals just how transnational the

industry has become: all four of the private companies that are currently operators of British
prisons—Group 4 Prison Services Limited, UK Detention Services, Premier Prison Services, and
Securicor Custodial Services—are local subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
Respectively, their parent companies are based in Denmark, France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 3.131-3.148, 4.20-4.60.

